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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I, The appellant asserted in the district court that the 
detention and subsequent searches violated Section 14, Article I, 
of the Constitution of Utah as well as the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and cited the primary cases from 
other jurisdictions he is relying upon in this court. 
The difference between the way the Fourth Amendment 
and Section 14, Article I is applied was not analyzed because the 
cases where that difference developed had not been decided at 
that time. 
The prosecutor furnished the district court an 
article which extensively analyzed the application of the 
Constitution of Utah to roadblocks. 
Point II. The issue of whether the roadblock was justified by 
compelling public need and because it was properly regulated was 
raised, in the first instance, by the prosecutor and by the 
authorities attached to the prosecutor's memorandum. The 
appellant did, in his opening memorandum in the district court 
assert that the type of roadblock utilized in the instant case 
would fail to meet the constitutional standards set out in State 
v. Deskins. 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1983). 
The court below considered the analysis incorporated 
in the authorities cited by the parties and expressly ruled on 
the issue of whether the roadblock was justified by public 
interest and planned to neutralize the officers1 discretion. 
Point III; Appellant expressly raised the issue of whether the 
search of his luggage violated the Constitution of Utah because 
of the lack of any circumstances coming within the recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: APPELLANT ADEQUATELY RAISED THE 
STATE CONSTITUTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The Brief of Appellee asserts that appellantfs State 
Constitutional arguments were not adequately developed in the 
court below. (Brief of Appellee at 6, 7, 14). 
Appellant asserted that both the detention and subsequent 
search were in violation of Section 14, Article I of the 
Constitution of Utah as well as the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution in his Motion to Suppress filed in the 
district court. (R-9). 
Appellant did not indulge in an analysis of the difference 
between state and federal constitutional protections against 
roadblocks because, at the time the matter was before the 
district court, the difference had not yet developed. The United 
States Supreme Court did not hold that a properly regulated 
2 
roadblock was permissible under the Fourth Amendment to meet a 
specified state law enforcement need until it did so in Michigan 
Department of State Police v. Sitz, 58 L.W. 4781 (June 14, 1990). 
However, appellant did argue in his Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Suppress that the seizure of the defendant which 
occurred as a result of the roadblock violated Section 14, 
Article I of the Constitution of Utah as well as the identically 
worded Fourth Amendment and noted that: 
It is note worthy that many of the 
state courts which have held roadblocks spot 
checks unconstitutional, have chosen to do so 
under their state constitutions. State v. 
Smith, 694 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. 1984); 
Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 502 A.2d 221 (Pa. 
Super. 1985); Nelson v. Lane County, 743 P.2d 
692 (Or. 1987); State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 
1057 (Ida. 1988). 
Memorandum at 4 and note 2. (R-16). These cases are the primary 
cases relied upon by appellant in his opening brief in Point I 
and Point II. See, Brief of Appellant at 16 and 2 4 - 2 7 . There 
were and are now no reported Utah cases on the legality of 
roadblocks under the Constitution of Utah. State v. Larocco, 
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Sup. Ct. May 29, 1990) which applied 
Section 14, Article I more stringently than the Fourth Amendment 
to searches of vehicles was not argued in the district court 
because it had not been decided at that point. However, a 
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lengthy analysis of the application of the Constitution of Utah 
to roadblocks appears in the Davis and Wallentine article,1 at 
6-10, attached to the prosecutor's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Suppress which was furnished to the district court 
below. The prosecutor's memorandum inexplicably does not appear 
in the record and appellant is moving to supplement the record. 
POINT II: THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE ROADBLOCK 
VIOLATED STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY NEED NOR 
PROPERLY REGULATED WAS ADDRESSED IN THE 
DISTRICT COURT. 
In Point III of his opening brief, appellant argued that, 
assuming the statutory authority of officers to conduct 
roadblocks and the per se constitutional validity of roadblocks, 
the roadblock in this case was nonetheless unconstitutional 
because it was not justified by demonstrated need nor properly 
regulated. 
While appellant did not himself raise this issue directly in 
the district court, the State did, citing State v. Deskins, 234 
Kan. 529, 673 P. 2d 1174 (1983) and relying heavily on Davis and 
Wallentine, The Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in 
1
 This is a draft of the article later published in an 
updated version in 3 BYU J. PUB. L. 357 (1989). 
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Utah: Public Interests Versus Individual Liberty2 and the 
Memorandum Decision of another district court judge in State v. 
Sims, both of which were attached to the State's Memorandum. 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress at 3-6. The 
State's memorandum and its attachments inexplicably do not appear 
in the record and appellant is now moving to supplement the 
record with those documents. 
Appellant, in his opening memorandum in the court below, 
chose to put his primary emphasis on the lack of statutory 
authority, however he did argue: 
If the state legislature had given the 
Highway Patrol such authority, and set out 
standards, say the standards devised by 
Sergeant Mangelson in his operation plan, it 
would then be necessary to see if that 
legislation met the standards for minimizing 
the infringement of liberty of motorists and 
the discretion of police officers. See, e. 
g., Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
(R-3), and in footnote 1, appellant went on: 
The defendants do not concede that the 
type of roadblock used here, if authorized by 
the Legislature, would past constitutional 
muster for it would clearly not do so. See, 
e. g., State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 
1983). For example, no reasonably effective 
z
 This was a draft of the article later published in an 
updated version in 3 BYU J. PUB. L. 357 (1989) and cited 
extensively in the Brief of Appellant. 
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prior notice of the roadblock was given to 
protect privacy, and not all drivers were 
questioned or required to produce their 
papers. 
Ibid. In State v. Deskins, it was held that the proper analysis 
for determining the constitutionality of a roadblock was to 
balance "the degree of legitimate governmental interests against 
the resulting intrusion" and the factors to be considered 
included, among others, "the degree of discretion left to 
officers in the field" and "standards set by superior officers." 
673 P.2d at 1176. 
In his Reply Memorandum, appellant argued: 
None of the authority cited by the State 
stands for the proposition, or even 
suggests,that field officers can devise their 
own criteria and controls for interfering 
with the liberty of motorists . . . 
(R-24). 
It is clear that the district court below applied the 
analysis, set out in State v. Deskins, supra., Davis and 
Wallentine, supra.. 3 BYU J. PUB. L. 374-75, 379-80, and State v. 
Sims, Memorandum Decision, Fourth District Court No. 151-D, at 5-
6, balancing the need for the roadblock versus the intrusion on 
liberty, which in turn is dependent upon "standards set by 
superior officers" and "the degree of discretion, if any, left to 
the officer in the field" among other factors. The court below 
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concluded: 
There now exists a history of escalating 
drug traffic along the stretch of Interstate 
15 where the roadblock in this case was 
conducted. There have been numerous arrests 
for drug violations in this area, and this 
tends to legitimize the public interest in 
predetermined checkpoints, systematically 
pursued by officers to minimize the burden to 
individual citizens without discretion to 
engage in random roving stops. 
With regard to issue number one, this 
Court concludes and finds that the roadblock 
in question was so planned and executed to 
minimize the intrusion on the traveling 
public's time and inconvenience, and was so 
structured to neutralize the officers 
unbridled discretion. (i.e. all vehicles 
except tractor-trailers and busses were 
stopped.) Thus the stop of the defendant's 
vehicle at the roadblock was a reasonable 
seizure, not violating defendant's federal 
Fourth Amendment rights or the defendant's 
rights under Article One, Section 14 of the 
Utah State Constitution. 
(R-26, 32) (Emphasis added). 
Thus it is clear that appellant is not raising an issue in 
Point III of his opening brief which was not raised and decided 
in the district court. The State itself argued the other side of 
the issue and furnished authority, which included most of the 
authority now relied upon by appellant, and the court below ruled 
upon that issue. 
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POINT III: APPELLANT PROPERLY RAISED THE 
STATE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITION AGAINST 
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES. 
In his memorandum in the court below, appellant did raise 
the same issue as that argued in Point IV of his opening brief 
here, saying: 
Since none of the recognized exceptions 
for searching containers found in the search 
of vehicles without obtaining a warrant were 
present in this case, the evidence of what 
was found in the luggage should be suppressed 
under the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Section 14, Article I 
of the Constitution of Utah, regardless of 
whether the stop and detention of the 
defendants or the search of the passenger 
compartment were legal. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress at p. 9. (R-14, 22) 
(Emphasis added). 
State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Sup. Ct. , May 30, 
1990) applying the state constitution's warrant clause to 
automobiles in the* absence of the recognized exceptions despite 
the federal courts refusal to so apply the federal constitution, 
was not cited in the court below because it had not yet been 
decided. Nonetheless, appellant did make the argument in the 
district court that, regardless of the legality of the detention 
and the search of the vehicle itself, a warrant to search the 
suitcases was required under the Constitution of Utah since the 
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contents were outside the reach of the arrested persons and the 
inventory exception was neither claimed nor applicable. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress at 8-9. (R-21, 22). 
CONCLUSION 
All the issues which appellant seeks to have this court 
decide were presented to the district court and the district 
court decided them. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this lOlLy day of December, 1990. 
£r*1*^+*U^{ 
ONNELL 
for Appellant 
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